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Government Disapproval of Religion
Jay Wexler*

The Supreme Court’s “Endorsement Test” for evaluating the constitutionality of
government sponsored symbols, displays, and messages regarding religion is
notoriously controversial and has engendered enormous scholarly attention. In
addition to government “endorsement” of religion, however, the test also prohibits
the government from sending a message of “disapproval” of religion. The
disapproval side of the Endorsement Test has not been subject to almost any
scholarly discussion, which is not surprising given that until recently the courts
have had no reason to entertain, much less sustain, challenges to alleged
government disapproval of religion. In the last few years, however, due to a variety
of social and cultural phenomena, several cases alleging disapproval have made it
to the federal courts. This, then, is a good time to begin consideration of what the
disapproval portion of the Endorsement Test should prohibit. In this Article, I
defend the idea that courts apply an “explicit negative reference” test to determine
if the government has unconstitutionally disapproved of religion. After explaining
and defending that test, the Article applies the test to the cases of alleged
disapproval that courts have been asked to consider. The Article concludes by
suggesting that the increasing importance of the disapproval portion of the
Endorsement Test weighs strongly in favor of courts keeping the Endorsement
Test despite the departure of its creator, Justice O’Connor, and the continued
criticism leveled at it from courts and commentators.
I.

Introduction

From its inception, the Supreme Court’s so-called “endorsement test” for
determining the constitutional validity of government symbols, displays, and other
messages that allegedly support religion has engendered extensive commentary and
controversy.1 The test requires courts to consider whether a “reasonable observer”
would believe that the government has sent “a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”2 Justice O’Connor first fashioned the test in her concurrence in the
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
For a very selective sampling of this vast literature, see, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987);
William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It:” The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 495 (1986); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2005); Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and
Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 499 (2002).
2 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
*
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Government Disapproval of Religion
crèche plus reindeer and elephant case of Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984,3 and five
members of the Court subsequently subscribed to the test five years later in the giant
Christmas tree next to a medium-sized menorah case of County of Allegheny v. ACLU.4
Critics of the test have been vociferous in their condemnation of the doctrine,
arguing that it is hopelessly indeterminate, inconsistent with the original meaning of
the Constitution, and biased toward majority faiths.5 Opponents also contend that
the test wrongly elevates mere offense to a constitutionally cognizable injury and
makes the federal courts look foolish.6 Defenders of the endorsement test
occasionally concede the silly-seemingness of the doctrine7 but generally argue that
its flaws are outweighed by its strengths, most notably its furtherance of the primary
goals of the Establishment Clause—keeping civil peace, respecting individual
conscience, and protecting religion from the dangerous effects of state support.8
Although the Supreme Court continues to apply the endorsement test in relevant
situations, there is no doubt that Justice O’Connor’s retirement in 2004 has left the
test in a highly precarious position.9
In all this hubbub about endorsement, it can be easy to forget that the
endorsement test is actually the endorsement slash disapproval test. The Court has
always maintained that government may send neither a message of endorsement nor a
message of disapproval of anyone’s religion or of religion in general. As Justice
O’Connor wrote in Lynch: “What is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion.
It is only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status
in the political community.”10 Again, Justice O’Connor in Allegheny: “An
Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only "coercive" practices or overt
efforts at government proselytization, . . . but fails to take account of the numerous
more subtle ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a
message of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious
liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political
community.”11 Although there is no controversy over whether the test, as a formal
matter, in fact prohibits the government from disapproving of religion, and although
pretty much every scholarly treatment of the endorsement test mentions disapproval
3 Id. (holding that the town of Pawtucket had not violated the Establishment Clause by sponsoring a
Christmas display involving a crèche of baby Jesus along with various secular objects like an elephant,
clowns, and reindeer).
4 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a state-sponsored display of a crèche standing alone
but refusing to strike down a display with a Christmas tree next to a menorah).
5 For a discussion of the prominent critiques of the endorsement test, see Jay D. Wexler, The
Endorsement Court, 21 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 263, 271-77 (2006).
6 See id.
7 At least I do. See id. at 287 (saying that the test is widely perceived as “downright goofy”).
8 For a defense of the endorsement test against the most prominent critiques, see id. at 277-287.
9 See, e.g., Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP.
CT. REV. 135.
10 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (emphasis mine).
11 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (emphasis mine).
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Government Disapproval of Religion
as part of the test, it is very rare to encounter any independent treatment of the
disapproval side of the endorsement/disapproval test (which is what I will call the
test from here on in, though I’ll abbreviate it as “the E/D test”). Indeed, I know of
no scholarly article that is devoted solely to the disapproval side of the E/D test.
This lack of academic attention to government disapproval of religion is not
surprising. Until 2009, no court had ever relied on a disapproval theory to strike
down a government symbol, display, message, or other action, and claims of
disapproval were exceedingly rare.12 Recently, however, things have begun to
change. The past few years have seen several serious claims of government
disapproval of religion arrive in the federal courts, and on at least two occasions,
these courts have held government action unconstitutional on this theory.13 In 2009,
a district court in California held that a public school teacher had violated the
Establishment Clause by referring to religion as “superstitious nonsense.”14 The
following a year, a closely divided en banc Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to San
Francisco’s condemnation of the Catholic Church’s position on gay adoption;15 three
judges would have found that condemnation unconstitutional under the E/D test.16
Finally, this past year a district court in Oklahoma struck down a state constitutional
amendment banning the use of Sharia law in state courts because the amendment
“convey[ed] a message of disapproval of [the] plaintiff’s faith.”17
These cases make clear the importance of paying newfound attention to the
disapproval portion of the E/D test. Writing in 1992, Professor (later Judge)
Michael McConnell, in what might be the most prominent discussion of disapproval
prior to this article, suggested in a total of two pages that the reason no court had
ever found a government disapproval of religion up to that point had to do with the
“structure of the Religion Clauses.”18 According to McConnell, when the
government appears to be disapproving of religion, it generally has a “secular
purpose for its action” and “there is no ‘religion’ that is being ‘established.’”19 What
12 I should note that I am talking here about independent claims of disapproval rather than
disapproval claims that are inherently linked with claims of endorsement. For example, the crèche in
Allegheny was struck down as an endorsement of Christianity, but it’s probably accurate to say that the
Court thought the display was also a disapproval of non-Christian religions. In those cases, the
question of disapproval is coextensive with the question of whether there is an endorsement. The
kinds of cases that have not existed (until recently) are cases in which the court is asked to strike down
a government action solely because that action disapproves of a religion without at the same time
endorsing some other religion.
13 In addition to the cases described below, see also O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216
(10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to university statute allegedly disapproving of Catholicism);
CAPEEM v. Noonan, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (analyzing claims that California’s Board
of Education adopted textbooks denigrating Hindusism).
14 C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 615 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
15 Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).
16 Id. at 1053-57.
17 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp.2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
18 Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 152 (1992).
19 Id.
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the recent cases demonstrate, however, is that the lack of disapproval cases prior to
recent years can be explained primarily by the existence of socio-cultural forces that
dissuaded government from expressing its official disapproval of religion and not by
anything having to do with the “structure of the Religion Clauses.” With the rise of
post 9/11 anti-Islamic sentiment,20 the growth of the so-called “New Atheism”
movement,21 and the growing willingness of government units in predominantly
liberal locales to stand up for gay rights in the presence of conservative religious
opposition,22 it has recently become more socially and politically acceptable in certain
contexts for government to actively criticize religious faiths. For this reason, it is
now a good time to begin a scholarly conversation about what constitutes an
unconstitutional disapproval of religion and what role the anti-disapproval norm
should play in overall Religion Clause jurisprudence.
In this Article, I begin this conversation in earnest. In Section II, I examine
what the anti-disapproval test should prohibit and propose what I call the “explicit
negative reference” test for evaluating disapproval claims. I suggest that the Free
Exercise Clause, rather than the E/D test, is the appropriate framework for
evaluating discriminatory government activity that imposes a substantial burden on
religious believers. I also argue that government messages expressing views about
social, political, scientific, or other issues that do not explicitly refer to religion but
are nonetheless offensive to religious believers are also not unconstitutional
disapprovals, because if they were, the government would be unable to function.
This leaves statements, displays, symbols, and other messages that do explicitly refer
to and condemn religion as subject to disapproval analysis, a task that will be, in
many cases, as difficult and controversial as typical endorsement analysis but equally
as important to keeping the government from taking explicit positions on religious
truth or value. Several specific issues are likely to arise with some frequency in
disapproval analysis, such as the importance of context and the question of whether
government can critique the social views of specific religious groups, and the Article
addresses these issues in particular. I conclude that the set of cases subject to
See, e.g., Lisa Wangsness, Religious Leaders Decry Anti-Muslim Sentiment, Bos. Globe, Sept. 7, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2010/09/religious_leade.html (noting a recent
increase in anti-Muslim sentiment); 'Islamophobia' Felt 5 Years After 9/11, ABC News, Sept. 9, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2413473&page=1.
21
See, e.g., Simon Hooper, The Rise of the ‘New Atheists’, CNN, Nov. 8, 2006,
http://articles.cnn.com/2006-11-08/world/atheism.feature_1_new-atheists-new-atheismreligion?_s=PM:WORLD.
22 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming
Largest
State
to
Pass
Law,
N.Y.
Times,
June
24,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-new-york-senate.html
(New York legislature passed gay marriage bill despite opposition from Catholic bishops and other
religious objections); Tim Craig, Nikita Stewart & Michelle Boorstein, Washington Mayor Fenty Signs
Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost .com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/18/AR2009121801789.html?nav=emailpage&sid= ST2009121802673
(noting that the mayor of D.C. signed a gay marriage bill into law despite threats from the Catholic
Church to end social services contracts with the city if the bill passed).
20
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disapproval analysis is relatively small but potentially quite significant given recent
trends.
After examining the three specific cases mentioned above in Section III of
the Article, with an eye toward further clarifying the reach of the disapproval test, I
conclude in Section IV with this observation about the state of Establishment Clause
doctrine: Given that the anti-disapproval test is necessary to keep the government
from casting explicit harmful aspersions on religion, and given that the disapproval
test is inherently linked to the endorsement test, the Supreme Court would be wise
to retain the E/D test despite Justice O’Connor’s departure from the Court and the
continuing stream of criticism aimed at the test. Without the E/D test, no legal
doctrine will exist to keep the government from explicitly criticizing religious belief, a
phenomenon that seems likely to become more and more prevalent as religious
diversity in the United States continues to increase.
II.

What Is Government Disapproval of Religion?

Professor McConnell’s discussion of disapproval provides a nice starting
point to consider the proper scope of the doctrine. McConnell was writing about
disapproval as part of his comprehensive critique of the E/D test; point #3 of his
argument against the test was its “bias against religion.”23 His argument basically
proceeds in two parts. First, he argues that courts have never used, and will likely
never have reason to use, the disapproval prong of the E/D test because when the
government does something that sends a message of disapproval of any given
religion, it will typically not be establishing any other religion and will typically have a
secular purpose for sending this message of disapproval.24 McConnell’s example
involves public schools that want to train their students to use condoms. Such
training clearly disapproves, according to McConnell, of a “tenet of the Roman
Catholic Church,” but it won’t count as an unconstitutional disapproval because
“there is no ‘religion’ of condom advocacy on the other side—nothing but a
particular secular view regarding public health and sexual hygiene.”25 Thus,
McConnell concludes: “When the government prefers secular ideas to religious
ideas, it does not violate the Establishment Clause, no matter how strong the
‘message of disapproval.’”26
Second, McConnell contends that while “the
appearance of disapproval more plausibly violates the Free Exercise Clause,” courts
have refused to find free exercise violations in the absence of some specific burden
placed upon believers by government action, and these same courts have been
extraordinarily stingy when deciding whether some action has in fact imposed such a

McConnell, supra, n. 18, at 152.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
23
24
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burden.27 As his example here, McConnell uses the famous Mozert case,28 in which
the Sixth Circuit refused to find unconstitutional a school district’s policy of teaching
from textbooks that included material offensive to the religious beliefs of some
parents. McConnell believes that Mozert is inconsistent with the Court’s crèche
cases. “Why is compelled exposure to governmental messages denigrating one’s
religion unconstitutional,” McConnell wonders, “while avoidable exposure to
governmental messages favorable to another religion is not?”29
Understanding why McConnell’s argument is flawed is key to figuring out
what role the disapproval prong of the E/D test should ideally play in reviewing
government action that appears contrary to some particular religious belief or
tradition. Starting with McConnell’s second critique—the one involving the Free
Exercise Clause—I would argue that while the critique is correct to challenge the
specific result in Mozert, it actually has nothing to do with delineating the proper
scope of the disapproval prong. Requiring students to study viewpoints or
information that is deeply offensive to their religious beliefs or the religious beliefs of
their parents (in Mozert the material was alleged to be offensive for many reasons,
including its emphasis on sexual equality and its insistence on evolution’s truth30)
should count as an actionable burden on religious belief, requiring the government to
pass strict scrutiny to avoid a free exercise violation. This is not the law under
current doctrine, but it should be.31 However, the remedy for a free exercise violation
is to grant an exemption to the plaintiff, not to prohibit the government from taking
the action altogether. Thus, the remedy in Mozert would have been to exempt the
relevant students from studying the challenged lessons. This is the only remedy that
makes any sense, because if the government were unable to present information to
anyone that is religiously offensive to someone, simply because the information was
inconsistent with someone’s religious belief, it is hard to see how the public schools
could function at all, given the extreme variety of religious views on almost every
imaginable issue. They certainly could not teach evolution, the big bang theory, or
the notion that the earth is a sphere.32 They couldn’t serve beef or pork in their

Id.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
29 McConnell, supra n. 18, at 153.
30 See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.
31 See id.; see also Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that even a substantial
burden placed on religious believers will not require a free exercise exemption if that burden is
imposed by a neutral law of general application).
32 See Terry Mortenson, Systematic Theology Texts and the Age of the Earth: A Response to the Views of
Erickson, Grudem, and Lewis and Demarest, 2 Answers Research Journal 175 (2009), available at
http://www.answersingenesis.org/contents/379/arj/v2/Systematic_theology
_Erickson_Grudem_Lewis.pdf (arguing that the earth is only 6,000 years old and rejecting evolution
as the origin of life); The Flat Earth Society, http://theflatearthsociety.org/cms/ (last visited July 8,
2011).
27
28
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cafeterias.33 They couldn’t teach such widely shared values as sexual and racial
equality, tolerance, or nonviolence.34
This insight answers McConnell’s question about the difference between
Mozert and the crèche cases.35 Mozert is rightly conceived of as posing a free exercise
question, with an exemption as the possible remedy, while the crèche cases pose an
establishment issue, with the potential remedy being an injunction of the challenged
display. It would make no sense to conceive of the crèche display as a free exercise
issue because how could a court possibly grant an exemption to a nonbleliever (and
here, recall, a nonbeliever includes not only nontheists but Jews, Buddhists, Hindus,
Taoists, and other non-Christians) from having to look at the display? Moreover, it
is not the case that the government would cease to function if it could not
specifically endorse any religious belief. Could the government continue if it were
unable to display a Menorah or a Buddha or the Ten Commandments or even a
Christmas Tree on public property? Of course it could.
All this is to say only that government actions which actually impose a
burden on religious believers, in the sense of compelling them to do something that
offends their religious beliefs or prevents them from engaging in their religious
practices in a way that it would potentially make sense to exempt them from the
government requirement, should be considered under the Free Exercise Clause
rather than the Establishment Clause. These actions are therefore analytically
distinct from government messages, symbols, displays, and other actions for which
exemptions make no sense as a remedy; these latter actions are more appropriately
treated as establishment issues, and are therefore the only ones that should be subject
to endorsement or disapproval analysis.
So, condoms. Given the above analysis, it would be helpful to distinguish
two analytically different aspects of a public school policy to train students to use
condoms to prevent pregnancy and venereal diseases. On the one hand is the part
of the policy requiring students to actually undergo the training—to listen to a
lecture about the importance of condom use, to hear the teacher say “when you have
sexual intercourse, use a condom,” to practice putting a condom on something, etc.
This is rightly conceived of as a free exercise problem—if it constitutes a burden on
the students’ religion (which I think it probably would), then the students should be
exempt from the lesson under the Free Exercise Clause. But McConnell is saying
that in addition to this specific compulsion, the condom policy also sends a general
message to the relevant population that the government thinks condom use is
33 See What is Halal?, Islamic Food and Nutritional Council of America, http://www.ifanca.org/halal/
(last visited Jul. 8, 2011) (stating that members of the Islamic faith do not eat pork).
34
See, e.g., Aryan Nations/Church of Jesus Christ Christians, Anti-Defamation League,
http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Aryan_Nations.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=
Extremism_in_America&xpicked=3&item=an (last visited Jul. 8, 2011) (describing the Church of
Jesus Christ Christians as a religious group that believes god created only the “white race” and calls
for the destruction of all other races).
35 See McConnell, supra n. 18, at 153.
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appropriate. Under McConnell’s view, this message presumably constitutes a
disapproval of religion and should be enjoined by the courts as an Establishment
Clause violation if those courts are serious about applying an evenhanded E/D test.36
Now we’re really starting to get to the heart of the issue. Does such a
message, standing alone—“condom use is good”—constitute a disapproval of
religion? For clarity’s sake, it might help to disaggregate the issues going on with the
classroom example and imagine examples that do not involve compulsion. Imagine
instead a public school principal giving a public speech where he or she announces
to the community that the school should teach condom use because condoms
promote public health. Or maybe a city council issuing a resolution to the same
effect. These examples involve no compulsion (nobody is required to practice
putting a condom on anything, or indeed even to attend the speech or read the
resolution) and therefore do not raise free exercise issues. But are they
unconstitutional disapprovals under the Establishment Clause?
To understand why they are not requires returning to the point made earlier
about how the public schools could not function if every message they sent could be
challenged for implicitly disapproving of somebody’s religious beliefs. What’s true
for the public schools is just as true for government in general. Given the vast
diversity of religious beliefs held by Americans, the variety of viewpoints held by
these religions on almost every imaginable issue, and the plethora of ways that the
government sends messages through its actions on a daily basis, government would
cease to function if messages like “condom use is good” could be enjoined by
religious believers.37 Should a Quaker pacifist be able to challenge the President’s
speech explaining the need for military vigilance against global enemies? Should an
Orthodox Jew be able to challenge the government’s support for “the other white
meat” or a particularly strict Jain be able to challenge the FDA’s support for a diet
high in vegetables. Should a religious polygamist be able to challenge the mayor’s
praise of monogamous marriages? Some religious believers object on the basis of
their religion to values so widely shared and held dear by most Americans as loyalty
to the country, equality of all citizens, and tolerance of diverse viewpoints.38 Surely,
it cannot count as a disapproval of religion for the government to expressly support
these values.
Therefore, if we agree that the government must continue, we must concede
that general messages that implicitly disapprove of views held by one or more
religious believers cannot count as unconstitutional disapprovals under the E/D test.
See id. at 152.
I’ve made this point several times elsewhere. See, e.g., JAY WEXLER, HOLY HULLABALOOS: A ROAD
TRIP TO THE BATTLEGROUNDS OF THE CHURCH/STATE WARS 214-15 (2009).
38 See n. 34, supra; see also Jerry Bergman, The Modern Religious Objection to Mandatory Flag Salute in America,
39 J. Church & St. 215, 226 (1997) (stating that some Mennonite groups object to saluting the
American flag).
36
37
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But this just brings us right back to McConnell’s essential objection. Isn’t
McConnell right that this is unfair and demonstrates the lopsidedness (and thus
worthlessness) of the E/D test? If the government cannot send a message that
endorses religion, why should it be able to send a message that disapproves of it?39
For this claim of unfairness to be persuasive, a strong analogy has to exist
between the type of message claimed to be a disapproval (“condom use is good”)
and the type of messages or displays that courts have held to be unconstitutional
endorsements (a stand-alone cross or crèche on public property). The analogy,
however, does not work. The stand-alone cross refers explicitly to religion, while the
condom message only implicitly disapproves of religion. This difference is crucial,
because the government rarely ever has to explicitly refer to religion, either to
endorse it or to disapprove it, while the government (if it is to function at all) must
be given the power to take and communicate positions that happen to implicitly
either endorse or disapprove of some religious viewpoint. The proper analogy, then,
to the “condom use is good” example is not the crèche or cross, but rather to a
governmental message that is consistent with a particular religious belief but does
not explicitly refer to it or rely upon it for support—in other words, something like
“abstinence is good.” No court has held nor likely will ever hold that a policy of
teaching abstinence (which, after all, has been supported by vast amounts of
government funding as of late40) constitutes a constitutional endorsement of religion,
even though many people surely perceive that policy as endorsing a particular
orthodox religious viewpoint. The government takes positions all the time that are
consistent with specific religious beliefs and may likely be perceived by certain
nonbelievers as a statement of support for that religious viewpoint. Consider, for
instance, the following: refusing to publicly fund abortions, prohibiting late-term
abortions, engaging in wars that are considered “just,” outlawing adultery and theft,
providing welfare to the poor, and taxing vices like liquor and cigarettes. From
somebody’s perspective, all of these things are likely to be perceived as endorsements
of religion, in the same way that McConnell perceives “condom use is good” as a
disapproval of religion, but finding them to be unconstitutional endorsements would
make government largely impossible.
On the other hand, the government rarely if ever needs to explicitly endorse
or disapprove of religion in general or a specific religion in particular. Thus, the
proper analogy to the stand-alone cross is not “condom use is good” but rather
something that explicitly criticizes a condom-disapproving religion—for example, a
display of a cross with an “X” through it or an official statement to the effect of:
“The Catholic Church is Wrong. Condom Use is Good.” With respect to the latter
statement, if the government is free (as it must be) to say that condom use is good,
what possible need would it have to add the part condemning the Catholic Church?
See McConnell, supra n. 18, at 152-53.
See John E. Taylor, Family Values, Courts, and Culture War: The Case of Abstinence-Only Sex Education, 18
William & Mary Bill of Rights J. 1053, 1062-66 (2010) (observing that “roughly 1.5 billion federal
dollars” has gone to abstinence only education).
39
40
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It is the addition of these few words that turns a constitutionally acceptable
statement into one that violates the disapproval prong of the E/D test.
The “explicit negative reference” test, as I’ll christen it here (so to speak), has
several features to recommend it. For one thing, by allowing the government to take
positions on important public issues so long as it does not explicitly refer to religion
in a derogatory fashion, the test ensures that government can continue to function
effectively. Secondly, by outlawing only explicit negative references to religion, the
test focuses on the government action that is most harmful to religion and most
likely to make believers feel like outsiders in the political community. Third, framing
the test in this way creates a fair parallel with the Court’s current endorsement
analysis; far from the test being lopsided, as McConnell asserts, the test actually
prohibits the government from sending analogous messages on both sides of the
endorsement/disapproval divide. Finally, although it will certainly not always be easy
for a court to decide if the government has disapproved of religion under the
“explicit negative reference” test, the test at least attempts to provide some relatively
clear guidance regarding what the government may say and what it may not.
Another example. Some religious believers—for instance, at least some
members of the Christian Science Church—believe that sick people should pray for
help and seek the care of a religious healer rather than going to a traditional medical
doctor.41 Assume that some federal study showed that fewer people were going to
see medical doctors than they should, and that this was costing lives and perhaps
draining the economy as well (perhaps because people were waiting until they got
really sick to see a doctor). The government knows about Christian Scientists, and it
also knows that some people refuse to go to doctors for other reasons unrelated to
religion. Imagine that the Secretary of Health and Human Services then issues an
announcement to try and convince people to go see doctors when they get sick.
Boiled down to their basic message, we might imagine four different types of
announcements, as follows:
(1)

If you are sick, then you should go to see a medical doctor.

(2)

If you are sick, then the only thing you can do is to see a medical
doctor; no other option will help.

(3)

Prayer will not help you. If you are sick, go see a medical doctor.

(4)

Christian Science doctrine is false. If you are sick, go see a medical
doctor.

41
See About Christian Science: Your Questions and Answers, available at
http://christianscience.com/questions-and-answers/2007/10/18/your-questions-and-answers (last
visited June 24, 2011).
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In a sense, of course, all four of these statements express disapproval of a
central tenet of the Christian Science faith, just as “condoms are good” expresses
disapproval, as McConnell explains, of a central tenet of the Catholic faith. In my
view, however, only statements (3) and (4) should be held unconstitutional under the
E/D test, statement (3) for explicitly disapproving of an inherently religious activity
(prayer), and statement (4) for explicitly disapproving of a specific faith. Because
statements (1) and (2) do not explicitly refer to religion, they should not be held
unconstitutional, even though they are certainly not neutral with respect to the
central beliefs of the Christian Science tradition. To the obvious retort that the test I
am suggesting is essentially arbitrary, I would concede that it is to an extent, but that
it is nonetheless advantageous for the reasons just provided.42
The test is certainly formalistic, in that it looks to the content of the
utterance or message or display itself to determine if there is a explicit negative
reference to religion. What if, as may occasionally be the case (we’ll see a real world
example in Section II43), the government says something like statement (1) or (2) in
direct response to a private religious individual or group’s statement to the contrary?
Imagine, for instance, that a Christian Science group launches an advertising
campaign in a town that urges citizens to consider forgoing medical help and to rely
on religious healers instead. For whatever reason, many citizens of the town find
themselves persuaded by the religious message. The mayor of the town is worried,
and he sends the following message, perhaps through a speech or a counteradvertising campaign:
(5)

A Christian Science group has urged citizens not to see medical
doctors for their health problems. The government urges you
instead to seek the advice of medical doctors if you become ill.
Seeking the advice of a medical doctor is the only safe way to deal
with a serious illness.

In my view, this message is constitutional, because although it clearly responds to a
position held by a religious group, it does not explicitly condemn that religious group
or its viewpoint. The courts must allow government to make a statement like (6),
because if they do not, the government will not be able to usefully put forth
divergent views on important social and cultural issues whenever those issues are
initially raised by a religious group. Although the government could put forth its
own views without referring to the views of the religious group first, such a
requirement would make it unduly difficult for the government to get its message
across effectively by placing it in context. Many listeners may have no idea why
suddenly the government is counseling its citizens to seek medical advice if they
become ill. The question is close, but I think the need for the government’s
messages to be understood in context should outweigh the slightly increased sense of
disapproval felt by religious believers who have attracted the government’s criticism.
42
43

See text accompanying notes 40-42, supra.
See text accompanying notes 49-68, infra.
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On the other hand, the government will rarely, if ever, have a need to go further, by
explicitly condemning the religious idea, as it has in this hypothetical statement:
(6)

A Christian Science group has urged citizens not to see medical
doctors for their health problems. The group’s message is wrong and
harmful. Please seek the advice of a medical doctor if you become ill.

The government’s message is fully and adequately communicated by statement (5).
All statement (6) adds to statement (5) is an explicit criticism of the religious group,
with no attendant benefit.
Such a statement should therefore be found
unconstitutional. But what about statement (7)?
(7)

A Christian Science group has urged citizens not to see medical
doctors for their health problems. We disagree. The government
urges you instead to seek the advice of medical doctors if you
become ill. Seeking the advice of a medical doctor is the only safe
way to deal with a serious illness.

This may be the most difficult case. Does the benefit of adding something like “we
disagree” to the government’s message here outweigh the additional harm to the
religion that the explicit statement of disagreement adds? It’s hard to say. My
inclination is to allow statement (7) as being more analogous to statement (5) than
statement (6), since the statement lacks an explicit criticism of Christian Science
doctrine, but reasonable minds may surely differ.
At this point, a possible objection to the explicit negative reference test could
be that it actually gives the disapproval side of the E/D test more force than the
endorsement side in one important sense, in that it prohibits the government from
saying anything explicitly critical of a religion’s social views or practices but does not
prohibit the government from saying something explicitly complementary about a
religion’s social views or practices. For instance, the government may clearly
approve of or congratulate or compliment or point to as a model some religious
group or church or organization that provides benefits to the community. Such a
message—for example, “we are deeply proud of the services that X church has
provided to the poor citizens of our commonwealth”—would never be held to be an
unconstitutional endorsement of the church.
Why, therefore, should the
government not be able to make a statement like (6) above or to say “we condemn
this church for the harm it has brought upon the children of the commonwealth”?
The reason is that the two messages are not really analogous. Praise of one religion
for doing something good for society (I’m not talking here about the truth or
inherent value of the religious tradition) does not send a message to other religions
and nonreligious people that they are disfavored, unless perhaps those other people
and groups have done something obviously exactly the same as the praised group but
have not received the same governmental support. Such instances (e.g., a Christian
Church and the next-door Hindu Temple provide the exact same services for the
12
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poor, but the mayor singles out the Church for praise and not the Temple) are likely
extremely rare. In the typical case of praise, then, no negative message is being sent
to nonbelievers. In a typical case of explicit disapproval, however, the negative
message to believers is obvious.
Still, though, this difference in how the doctrine applies to endorsements and
disapprovals makes me slightly uncomfortable, and for that reason (as well as
because it makes sense to move incrementally in difficult areas of law44), I would
suggest that the courts at least tentatively apply a strict scrutiny standard to
disapprovals rather than striking them down automatically (automatic invalidation is
the norm for endorsements). If the government can show that the explicit referral to
religion is absolutely necessary to fulfill a compelling interest, then perhaps the
disapproval should be allowed. One could imagine a situation arising where the
government has to explicitly condemn a particular religious group to communicate
its message effectively, perhaps in an emergency where the government finds itself in
direct violent conflict with the group. The cases where this would arise should be
extremely rare, but the doctrine should allow for the possibility, at least until it
becomes clear to courts that the extremely narrow exception is unnecessary.
By proposing what might appear to be a single factor test for evaluating
alleged governmental disapprovals of religion, I certainly do not mean to imply that
application of the test will be at all simple or straightforward. Quite the contrary.
Indeed, given that the test occupies the other side of the coin from the notoriously
indeterminate endorsement inquiry, I would expect application of the disapproval
standard to be equally difficult. For one thing, it may be hard in some cases for
courts to determine if a reference to religion is explicit. Likely more difficult will be
the question of whether any given message constitutes a “disapproval.” As with the
question of endorsement, courts will have to give nuanced consideration to all the
relevant circumstances to figure out the meaning of any given message, symbol, or
display.45 Finally, some cases—for example, when a public school or museum seeks
to explain or illustrate how some people feel about a particular religious tradition or
school within a religion or religion in general—will raise the issue of who is actually
sending the message, the government itself or the person or persons whose message
the government is trying to explain. As we will see in the next Section of the Article,
many of these difficult issues are raised by the three disapproval cases that have
reached the federal courts in recent years and that I mentioned in the Introduction.
Investigation of these cases will provide a fuller understanding of the disapproval
inquiry and the “explicit negative reference” test, while also demonstrating that the
See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 298, 309 (1998).
45 And, of course, the disapproval inquiry raises all of the familiar doctrinal and theoretical issues that
are perennially raised by the endorsement question—e.g., who is the reasonable observer, what should
courts assume about the reasonable observer’s understanding of historical context, etc. etc. Clearly
these are difficult issues, and I make no attempt to address them here. For my views on some of
these issues, see Wexler, supra n. 5, at 282-85.
44
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E/D test’s disapproval prohibition plays an important role in enforcing key values
furthered by the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.
III.
A.

The Courts Encounter Disapproval

Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. San Francisco

In 2003, the Catholic Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
sitting in the Vatican, issued its official view that Catholics around the world should
oppose efforts to legalize or promote gay marriage or to allow gay couples to adopt
children. Cardinal William Levada, the head of the Congregation, specifically
ordered the Archdiocese of San Francisco not to place children for adoption with
gay couples. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors responded by passing the
following resolution (“Resolution 168-06”):
Resolution urging Cardinal William Levada, in his capacity as
head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the
Vatican, to withdraw his discriminatory and defamatory
directive that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San
Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with
homosexual households.
WHEREAS, It is an insult to all San Franciscans when a foreign
country, like the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively
influence this great City's existing and established customs and
traditions such as the right of same-sex couples to adopt and care for
children in need; and
WHEREAS, The statements of Cardinal Levada and the Vatican that
“Catholic agencies should not place children for adoption in
homosexual households,” and “Allowing children to be adopted by
persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence to
these children” are absolutely unacceptable to the citizenry of San
Francisco; and
WHEREAS, Such hateful and discriminatory rhetoric is both
insulting and callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance
which has seldom been encountered by this Board of Supervisors;
and
WHEREAS, Same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as
are heterosexual couples; and
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WHEREAS, Cardinal Levada is a decidedly unqualified
representative of his former home city, and of the people of San
Francisco and the values they hold dear; and
WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors urges Archbishop Niederauer
and the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco to
defy all discriminatory directives of Cardinal Levada; now, therefore,
be it
RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges Cardinal William
Levada, in his capacity as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith at the Vatican (formerly known as Holy Office of the
Inquisition), to withdraw his discriminatory and defamatory directive
that Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco stop
placing children in need of adoption with homosexual households.46
Following the issuance of the Resolution, two devout Catholics living in San
Francisco, along with a Catholic civil rights organization, sued the city, claiming that
the Resolution violated the Establishment Clause because it sent a message of
disapproval of the Catholic Church. The district court found no Establishment
Clause violation,47 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.48 The
Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc.49
In a complicated set of opinions issued in October of 2010, the en banc
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.50 The court split on both the
merits of the plaintiffs’ challenge and on the question whether the plaintiffs had
standing. In an opinion written by Judge Graber, five judges concluded that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.51 In an opinion written by Judge Silverman, three judges
concluded that although the plaintiffs did have standing, they lost on the merits.52
Finally, in an opinion written by Judge Kleinfeld, three judges found that the
plaintiffs had standing and succeeded on the merits. Put altogether, then, the court
voted 8-3 to affirm the district court’s dismissal.53 The standing question is, of
course, quite difficult and important. Here, however, I will focus only on the merits
of the disapproval claim, upon which the court evenly split 3-3, with five judges
reaching no opinion on the matter.

Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1047.
Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. San Francisco, 464 F.Supp.2d 938 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
48 Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. San Francisco, 567 F. 3d 595 (9th Cir. 2009).
49 Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. San Francisco, 586 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2010).
50 Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1046.
51 Id. at 1062-82.
52 Id. at 1060-62.
53 Id. at 1046-60.
46
47
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Judge Silverman’s opinion finding that the city’s Resolution did not violate
the Establishment Clause rested on the view that the government is free to criticize
the secular positions taken by religious individuals and organizations so long as this
criticism is motivated by a secular purpose. Here, according to the three judges who
subscribed to this view, the city had merely expressed its longstanding secular views
about the acceptability of placing children for adoption with same-sex couples, and
the fact that these views were accompanied by critiques of a religious organization
made no difference to the result. It was key for these three judges that the city had
expressed its view on a secular issue (adoption by same-sex couples) as opposed to a
theological one. “We would have a different case on our hands,” wrote Judge
Silverman, “had the defendants called upon Cardinal Levada to recant his views on
transubstantiation. . . .”54 According to the judges, public officials have every right to
speak out in their official capacities on matters of secular concern to their
constituencies, even if their statements offend the religious feelings of some. . . .”55
If the “mere fact that a resolution calls out a church or clergyman”56 were enough to
turn government speech into a constitutional violation, then “the Establishment
Clause would gag secular officials from responding to religious entities even when
those entities have chosen to enter the secular fray.”57
The three judges who came out the other way on the merits saw things quite
differently. Beginning with the observation that “[w]e have not found another
Establishment Clause case brought by people whose religion was directly
condemned by their government,”58 and citing a Free Exercise Clause decision of the
Court59 for the “principle that government has no legitimate role under the
Establishment Clause in judging the religious beliefs of the people—either by praise
or denunciation,”60 these three judges found that the city had expressed a clear and
explicit message of disapproval of the Catholic Church. Although the city would
have been fine if it had limited itself to the fourth “whereas” in the Resolution—the
one stating that same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as heterosexual
couples—it had gone too far in the rest of the Resolution.61 “The message . . . is
explicit,” concluded the judges, “a Catholic doctrine duly communicated by the part
of the Catholic church in charge of clarifying doctrine is ‘hateful,’ ‘defamatory,’
‘insulting,’ ‘callous,’ and ‘discriminatory,’ showing ‘insensitivity and ignorance,’ . . .
This is indeed a ‘message of disapproval.”62 The three judges on this side of the
merits issue were expressly concerned with issues of fairness and practicality. With
regard to matters of practicality, the judges cited possible “serious consequences”
that could ensue when the government sends a message of disapproval—everything
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1060.
56 Id. at 1061.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1054.
59 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 532 (1992).
60 Catholic Charities, 624 F.3d at 1054.
61 Id. at 1055.
62 Id. at 1057.
54
55
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from vandalism to religious discrimination in the workplace to having one’s car
“keyed in the parking lot.”63 On fairness, the judges were concerned that the
Establishment Clause’s anti-disapproval standard be enforced just as strongly as its
anti-endorsement rule. As judge Kleinfeld put it: “No practical or fair reading could
construe the Establishment Clause as prohibiting only government endorsement and
not government condemnation of religion.”64
I chose to discuss this case first among the three cases in this Section because
it follows closely on the issues raised in Section II. Here we have a government
entity directly responding to the pronouncement of a religious organization on an
issue that is legitimately important to the government. Taken as a whole, the city’s
Resolution presents a fairly straightforward example of the explicit negative reference
test, for exactly the reasons given by the Kleinfeld opinion. The Resolution explicitly
singles out the Cardinal, the Congregation, and the Vatican and directs a series of
negative epithets in their direction. The Resolution is analogous to statement (6)
above and—the issue of standing aside—was unconstitutional.
What about Judge Silverman’s attempted distinction between government
comments on social or policy issues on the one hand and theological issues on the
other hand? Might this work as an alternative test for determining if a government
message of some sort constitutes an unconstitutional disapproval of religion? Should
we allow the government to criticize a religion as directly and effusively as it wants
with respect to that religion’s views on secular matters but prohibit the government
from attacking in any way the religion’s theological positions.
At first glance, this test has some appeal. It would, for example, go some
way toward addressing the issue raised earlier regarding the government’s freedom to
praise religious individuals and organizations for their secular achievements, like
providing food or shelter for those in need.65 Silverman’s test would provide
balance, allowing the state either to praise religion or criticize it for its so-called
secular pursuits. And, of course, Silverman is right that the government has no
business criticizing a religion’s view about the nature of ultimate reality or anything
else that would appear to be clearly theological. We surely wouldn’t want the
government to be able to make theological judgments like “There is no Tao” or
“Transubstantiation is a Lie” or “The Eightfold Path to End Suffering Actually Has
Nine Steps Not Eight.”66
The reason, however, that the government cannot make pronouncements
about the Tao or transubstantiation or the eightfold path has nothing to do with
whether those concepts are theological from the perspective of the religion in
question. It would be a mistake to assume that any religion sees a clear line (or,
Id. at 1059.
Id.
65 See text accompanying notes 43-45, supra.
66 On the eightfold path, see WALPOLA RAHULA, WHAT THE BUDDHA TAUGHT 45-51 (1959).
63
64
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indeed, any line) between what it sees as its theological teachings and what it sees as
its ethical, moral, social, or political teachings. Are the Catholic Church’s views on
abortion or gay marriage unrelated to its theology? When a Taoist supports the
Endangered Species Act because he believes that all beings are interrelated through
the Tao, is that judgment separate from the Taoist’s theology? As the existence of
the field of “theological ethics” suggests, the relationship between theology and
ethics is inseparable. At the very least, enabling courts to determine which aspects of
a religion’s teachings count as “secular” and which count as “theological” would be
fraught with danger and directly at odds with the Establishment Clause’s antientanglement norm.67
The reason that we allow government to speak on some issues but not on
others when it comes to religion has to do with our views about what issues
government in the United States can properly concern itself with, rather than our
views on what parts of a religion’s dogma can reasonably be described as
“theological.” We want government to be able to comment on issues relating to
abortion or gay marriage or welfare or nutrition or the justness of some military
endeavor because those issues are related to the proper role of government in a way
that the question of whether Christ is really present in the communion is not. But
government already has the authority to speak its mind on any of these secular (for
lack of a better term) issues. It can put forth its view that abortion should be legal
but not promoted by the state or that gay marriage should (or should not) be allowed
or that the government should provide (or not provide) welfare to those in need or
that people should eat many servings of vegetables or that we should (or should not)
invade Iraq. Nobody questions the government’s authority to speak on these
questions; the only issue when it comes to disapproval under the Establishment
Clause is whether it can accompany these statements with explicit criticisms of a
religious individual, group, or tradition that disagrees with the government’s views.
And, as I’ve suggested above, the government will almost never need to attack a
religion to make its views on a secular issue known to its citizens.68 San Francisco
could have sufficiently achieved its goals of supporting adoption by gay couples by
issuing a Resolution putting forth its views about that matter and supporting those
views with whatever data or moral argumentation it wished (analogous to statement
#5). It could even have made it clear that it was responding to the Vatican’s position
by referring to that position and stating simply its disagreement without attacking the
Vatican itself (statement #7). Anything more than that should be considered
disapproval in violation of the First Amendment.
It is probably worth considering what kinds of government statements the
Silverman test would allow. Remember, the rule would basically immunize the
government from saying anything it wants about any religion so long as it does so in
the context of critiquing the religion’s viewpoints on “secular” issues. Do we really
67 On entanglement, see, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 35-38 (2002).
68 See text accompanying notes 40-42, supra.
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want the government to be able to lash out at religion like this? Imagine a city’s
resolution stating that the leaders of a religious group hostile to stem cell research are
a “bunch of evil, small-brained, hateful morons, intent on destroying the lives of
millions of sick Americans,” or that an atheist group opposed to a proposed military
operation is filled with “godless, soulless shells of people with no moral sense and
the hearts of mice.” I could go on here, though I won’t (use your imagination), but
the key point should be clear—we should have some doctrinal mechanism for
preventing the government from engaging in all out attacks on religion if we want a
country where religious groups feel free to reflect on moral and political issues and
engage their views on these matters in public without the fear of official persecution.
This analysis provided here also answers the other key contention raised by
Judge Silverman’s opinion—the notion that government officials would be “gagged”
from responding to religious entities that have taken a public position if those
officials are not allowed to attack the religious entity itself. This is simply untrue.
The government may put forth its affirmative arguments for the position it favors as
strongly and as comprehensively and as often as it wants. It can use its money and
access to the media and other inherent advantages to express and disseminate its
affirmative views whenever it chooses. The only way in which the Establishment
Clause limits the government’s authority to speak in this context is by prohibiting it
from leveling explicit attacks on the religious individuals and groups who take a
contrary position. This is hardly a gag. Rather, it represents a fair balance between
the need for government to govern effectively with the protection that the First
Amendment provides for religion.
B.

Awad v. Ziriax

For what are surely complicated social, cultural, and political reasons, in the
past few years a large number of states have begun considering laws and
constitutional amendments to prohibit their courts from using “Sharia Law.”69 As of
early 2011, at least forty measures in at least twenty states have been introduced that
would, in one way or another, prohibit the use of Sharia law within the state.70 Some
of these proposals specifically name Sharia law, while others seek to prohibit in some
way the use of “foreign” law, which would include Sharia law as well as the laws of
other religious traditions.71 A handful of proposals have in fact been enacted into
law, the most notorious of which is Oklahoma’s “Resolution 1056,” entitled the
See The Law of the Land, ABA Journal, April 2011, at 14.
See Bill Rattery, Bans on Court Use of Shariah and/or International Law, Gavel to Gavel,
http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2011/06/03/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-38-of-47-billsdied-or-rejected-this-session-only-1-enacted-into-law/ (last visited June 30, 2011).
71 An example of this kind of law is Arizona H.B. 2064, signed by the Governor in April, 2011. See
http://www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_Number=hb2064&Session_Id=102 (last visited June 30,
2011).
69
70
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“Save Our State Amendment.” Resolution 1056 proposed to amend Section 1 of
Article VII of the state constitution by prohibiting the use of Sharia Law within
Oklahoma as follows:
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section when
exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law
as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma
Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the
United States provided the law of the other state does not include
Sharia Law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to
the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of
this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts
including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.72
Although State Representative Rex Duncan, the sponsor of Resolution 1056,
conceded that no Oklahoma court had ever used Sharia law,73 he, along with other
legislators who supported the measure, were outspoken in their criticism of Muslims
in general and Sharia law specifically in their statements connected to the law.74
The resolution was voted on directly by the voters of Oklahoma in a
November, 2010 election and was approved of overwhelmingly.75 Before the
amendment became effective, however, it was challenged in federal district court by
a plaintiff who claimed, among other things, that the law’s “official condemnation
will result in a stigma attaching to his person, relegating him to an ineffectual
position within the political community, and causing him injury.”76 The district judge
assigned the case agreed and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the state from
certifying election results and thus implementing the constitutional amendment.77
Judge Miles-LaGrange’s Establishment Clause analysis was brief and straightforward.
In response to the defendant’s contention that the amendment was “merely a choice
of law provision,” the court found instead that the amendment, by singling out
Sharia Law for special negative treatment, had conveyed “a message of disapproval

Oklahoma Enrolled House Joint Resolution 1056, at 2, reprinted in Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d
1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
73 See Brief of Amici Curiae The American Jewish Committee, et al., Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273 (10th
Cir.), filed 5/16/2011, at p. 29 (reporting that having been asked whether any court in Oklahoma had
ever decided a case using Sharia Law, responded “Not yet, and you know what, there won’t be any
with passage of [the amendment]”).
74 See id. at p. 9-11 (reporting, among other things, that “days before Oklahomans voted on [the
amendment], Duncan noted in a public appearance that Sharia law’s prevalence in the United
Kingdom was ‘a cancer upon the survivability of the UK’”).
75 See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d, at 1302 (stating that 70.08% of voters approved of the measure).
76 Id. at 1303.
77 Id. at 1308.
72

20
THIS IS A DRAFT *** THIS IS A DRAFT *** THIS IS A DRAFT *** THIS IS A DRAFT

Government Disapproval of Religion
of plaintiff’s faith.”78 The judge buttressed her view by relying on evidence presented
demonstrating that Sharia law “is not actually ‘law’, but is religious traditions that
provide guidance to plaintiff and other Muslims regarding the exercise of their
faith.”79 As a result, the court concluded that “plaintiff’s religious traditions and faith
are the only non-legal content subject to the judicial exclusion set forth in the
amendment.”80 The decision is currently on appeal in the Tenth Circuit.
In my view, the judge’s conclusion here was correct, although this is clearly a
different type of case from the San Francisco case. The main difference is that in the
San Francisco case, both the reference to religion and the disapproval were explicit,
whereas here the reference to religion is explicit,81 but the disapproval is probably
best described as implicit rather than explicit. This is a good place, then, to make it
clear that the “explicit” in “explicit negative reference” refers to the identification of
the religion in question rather than to the disapproval. A message of disapproval,
like a message of endorsement, can be sent in all sorts of ways, from the direct (“X
religion” is “wrong” or “evil” or “callous” or “ignorant”) to the implied.
Here, the state has not—at least in the Resolution itself—explicitly
disapproved of Sharia law by condemning or criticizing it. Rather, it has simply
forbidden its use by state courts without explicitly articulating why this would be a
good idea. Nonetheless, in my judgment, given all of the circumstances (and the
exercise of judgment given the totality of the circumstances is what is called for by
the E/D test82), the state has sent a message of disapproval here. The judge had it
exactly right by focusing on the “singling out” aspect of the Oklahoma amendment.
True, the amendment mentioned “the legal precepts of other nations” and
“international law” as well as “Sharia Law,” but by not mentioning any other

Id. at 1306.
Id.
80 Id. The judge also found that the plaintiff had standing. See id. at 1303 (“Plaintiff has sufficiently
set forth a personal stake in this action by alleging that he lives in Oklahoma, is a Muslim, that the
amendment conveys an official government message of disapproval and hostility toward his religious
beliefs . . .”). Furthermore, the judge also believed the plaintiff had made out a sufficient showing for
a free exercise violation based on his claim that the amendment would make it difficult for the state to
probate his will and for Muslim plaintiffs to bring religious liberty claims based on their beliefs in the
future. See id. at 1307. I do not discuss these aspects of the court’s decision here.
81 I suppose there is a colorable claim here that the amendment’s reference to “Sharia Law” is not a
reference to religion. I believe the judge was correct, however, to conclude that “Sharia Law” is
inherently religious, and I will not discuss the point further here. See also Dominic McGoldrick,
Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs From Generally
Applicable Laws, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 603-06 (2009) (“To believing Muslims, it is
something deeper and higher, infused with moral and metaphysical purpose. At its core, shariah
represents the idea that all human beings--and all human governments-- are subject to justice under
the law’.”).
82 See, e.g., David Goldberger, Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette: Be Aware of Justice
Scalia’s Per Se Rule, 6 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (noting that the endorsement test requires a
“careful assessment of the totality of all relevant facts and inferences in the record to determine
whether there is an impermissible government endorsement of religion”).
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analogous systems of religious law (and there are many of these systems83), the
amendment conveys that Sharia law is uniquely disfavored among systems of
religious law. Particularly when combined with the “Save our State” title, the
Resolution clearly sends a message of disapproval of Sharia law to any reasonable
believer or observer.
What about the statements that were made by the sponsor and other
supporters in favor of the amendment? According to an amicus brief filed in the
Tenth Circuit in favor of the district court’s decision,84 Representative Duncan and
other supporters of the Resolution focused their support for the law on the need to
stop Sharia Law from making headway into Oklahoma.85 These supporters did not
focus on any “legal precepts of other nations” that posed a danger to the state, and
they made clear their disdain for Sharia Law. For instance, Representative Duncan
argued that the newfound popularity of Sharia law in England had become “a cancer
upon the survivability of the UK”86 and that the Oklahoma Resolution would
“constitute a pre-emptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma.”87 “While
Oklahoma is still able to defend itself against this sort of hideous invasion,” Duncan
continued, “we should do so.”88
Should courts consider statements like these when deciding whether some
particular legal action is an unconstitutional disapproval of religion? The question is
an important one that is likely to recur in other cases, so it’s worth commenting on
here even though in this case the Resolution by itself sends a message of disapproval,
thereby making it unnecessary for the courts to consider any external supporting
statements.89 Statements like these may be relevant to a disapproval challenge, in my
opinion, not because they evidence an unconstitutional governmental purpose,90 but
rather because they can, under certain circumstances, contribute to conveying an
objective message of disapproval. In a case, for example, where the law on its face
See, e.g., FRANK S. RAVITCH, LAW AND RELIGION, A READER: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND THEORY
881-955 (2008) (discussing, with materials, Jewish Law, Islamic Law, Buddhist Law, Hindu Law, and
Christian Law).
84 See n. 74, supra. The amici brief was filed on behalf of the following organizations: The American
Jewish Committee, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, The Anti-Defamation
League, The Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, The Center for Islamic Pluralism,
Interfaith Alliance, and The Union for Reform Judaism.
85 See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra n. 73, at 9-12.
86 Id at 9. (quoting Gale Courey Toensing, Oklahoma Lawmakers Aim to Ban International and Sharia Law
from State Courts, Indian Country Today, Oct. 27, 2010).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 10.
89 The district court did not point to any supporting statements in favor of its conclusion. Because I
do not think these statements are necessary to support a finding of unconstitutionality, I have not
engaged in any independent research or analysis regarding them.
90 Courts, of course, continue to use purpose analysis in Establishment Clause challenges, see, e.g.,
Awad, 1298 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-06. I find purpose analysis unsatisfying and potentially overly
restrictive on the free speech rights of legislators, but I also think that the same evidence which can
show a religious purpose can often be used to show that a message will objectively be received as
promoting or disapproving of religion.
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may or may not be understood as sending a message of disapproval (for instance,
with those laws that ban Sharia law as one aspect of “foreign law”91), evidence that
the sponsors of the law made public statements that themselves expressed
disapproval can go a long way toward showing that the law itself would be
understood by a reasonable observer as conveying a similar message.92
C.

C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School District

This case involves a challenge to certain alleged statements made by a teacher
named James Corbett in his Advanced Placement European History course at the
Capistrano Valley High School in southern California. A student in the class, Chad
Farnan (referred to as “C.F.” in court documents), sued the school district and the
teacher, claiming that many of Corbett’s statements violated the Establishment
Clause by disapproving of religion and Christianity. James Selna, the district court
judge hearing the case, held for the school district on all of Farnan’s challenges
except for one.93 On that one claim, the judge nonetheless found that the school
district could not be held liable for Corbett’s statements.94 In later proceedings, the
judge also found that Corbett could not be held liable for money damages because
the right he had violated was not “clearly established” as required for a finding of
section 1983 liability.95 Both parties appealed, and the case is currently being
considered by the Ninth Circuit.
Four of Corbett’s comments challenged by Farnan are of particular interest
for the purposes of the Article:96
(1)

“Abstinence-only policies do not work.”97

(2)
“I will not leave John Peloza [a teacher who sued Corbett for
advising a school newspaper that claimed Peloza taught religion in his science
classroom] alone to propagandize kids with this religious, superstitious nonsense.”98

See text accompanying note 71, supra.
I’ve made this point the context of endorsement before. See Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed
Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV.
1253-54 & n. 361 (2002).
93 C.F. v. Capistrano, 615 F. Supp. 2d, at 1153.
94 Id. at 1154-55.
95 C.F. v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 656 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
96 Actually, many of Corbett’s comments, and the court’s responses to the comments, are interesting
from the perspective of what constitutes disapproval, but for the sake of relative brevity, I will confine
my analysis to these four, because they are the most interesting.
97 Capistrano, 615 F.Supp. 2d at 1142. This quotation is paraphrased.
98 Id. at 1146.
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(3)
“What was it that Mark Twain said? ‘Religion was invented when the
first con man met the first fool.’”99
(4)
“[C]onservatives don’t want women to avoid pregnancies. That’s
interfering with God’s work. You got to stay pregnant, barefoot, and in the kitchen
and have babies until your body collapses. All over the world, doesn’t matter where
you go, the conservatives want control over women’s reproductive capacity.
Everywhere in the world. From conservative Christians in this country to, um,
Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan. It’s the same. It’s stunning how vitally
interested they are in controlling women.”100
The court ruled for the plaintiff with respect to comment (2) but against him
on the other three comments. The court described comment (1) as an example of a
statement that “does not touch upon or mention religion”101 and found that such
statements “do not violate the Establishment Clause merely because a particular
religious group may find the official’s position incorrect or offensive.”102 Otherwise,
the judge observed, teachers would have to “tailor [their] comments so as not to
offend or disagree with any religious group,”103 something that would be
“unworkable given the number of different religious viewpoints on various issues.”104
On comment (2), however, the court found that Corbett lacked any legitimate
secular purpose for stating his “unequivocal belief that creationism is ‘superstitious
nonsense,’”105 and had sent a “message of disapproval of religion or creationism.”106
According to the judge: “Corbett could have criticized Peloza for teaching religious
views in class without disparaging those views.”107
Though the court found comments (1) and (2) to pose relatively easy
questions, it found that comments (3) and (4) were somewhat more difficult. With
regard to the Mark Twain quotation from comment (3), the court noted that it
required “close scrutiny.”108 Although the court conceded that the Twain’s quotation
was “biting,”109 it nonetheless found that Corbett’s invocation of it passed
constitutional muster for at least two reasons: because “[t]he remark comes as part of
a historical discussion of the tension between religion and science,”110 and because it
was “not clear that Corbett was espousing Twain’s view rather than merely quoting

Id.
Id. at 1150.
101 Id. at 1142.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1146.
106 Id. at 1149.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1146.
109 Id.
110 Id.
99
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it.”111 Thus, the court concluded that the primary purpose of the comment was not
“to disparage”112 and that its effect “was not to disapprove”113 of religion. Finally, on
comment (4), the court said this:
Corbett is primarily giving his opinion that women should have
control over reproductive choices. As discussed above, even if
certain religious groups find Corbett’s position on the political issue
offensive or incorrect, there is no violation of the Establishment
Clause. The Court recognizes, however, that Corbett is also
expressing disapproval of certain religious positions on the issue.
However . . . it seems that the statements from which disapproval can
be inferred are only incidental and ancillary to Corbett’s primary
political point regarding reproduction.114
The court reached the correct result with regard to comments (1) and (2).
Because the comment about abstinence-only policies did not expressly refer to
religion, it does not run afoul of the explicit negative reference test and is therefore
not unconstitutional. I would take slight issue with the court’s use of the phrase “not
touching upon religion,” however. What distinguishes the comment is that it does
not explicitly mention religion; it is harder to say whether it “touches upon religion.”
One might plausibly say that it does touch upon religion by implying that certain
religious views about education do not work. Certainly somebody who strongly
believes because of her religion that schools should teach abstinence and that
abstinence education works would think that the comment “touches” upon her
religion. Likewise, the court was right to condemn the “superstitious nonsense”
comment; this is as clear a violation of the explicit negative reference test as one can
imagine. The government has no business declaring that somebody’s religious
beliefs are nonsense.
Comments (3) and (4) indeed pose more difficult questions. On the Mark
Twain quotation, the key question is whether the teacher was simply using the quote
to illustrate what some people have said about religion, or whether the teacher was in
fact expressing his own view through the quotation. If, for example, Corbett had
said something like, “Is religion something a reasonable person believes in? Well,
what is it that Mark Twain said…” and then gave the quote, the argument would
become quite strong that the teacher had sent a message of disapproval. On the
other hand, if Corbett’s remark was more on the manner of “In the past 150 years,
many people have questioned the validity of religious belief. One of those people
Id. at 1147.
Id.
113 Id. at 1149.
114 Id. at 1150 (citing American Family Association, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d
1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a resolution disparaging anti-gay ads supported by a religious group
was not unconstitutional because “any statements from which disapproval can be inferred [were] only
incidental and ancillary”)).
111
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was Mark Twain, who once said…,” then the quotation becomes constitutionally
acceptable. The distinction is essentially the one between teaching religion, on the
one hand, and teaching about religion on the other hand.115 The government may,
and indeed should, teach students about religion to create citizens who can
understand our most difficult public issues, and this entails teaching them about
prominent historical and current critiques of religion, but the government should
not, and cannot, teach students that religion (or any particular religion) is good, bad,
true, or false. Without access to more facts (a transcript of the class, for instance), it
is hard to evaluate the court’s analysis of this issue, but at least one of the questions it
asked (whether Corbett was “espousing” Twain’s view) gets pretty close to the
central issue. It’s worth observing, however, that the court’s other key point—that
the remark came as part of a “historical discussion”—is not by itself meaningful. If
the teacher espoused the Twain view, then he acted unconstitutionally, even if he
espoused it in the context of a historical discussion.
Finally, there are the comments about religion and reproduction. The matter
is surely close, but from the information provided by the opinion, it appears that the
court got this issue wrong. The teacher clearly identified religion as one of the
sources of his displeasure, not only naming “conservative Christians” and “Muslim
fundamentalists” but also invoking “God’s work.” And there’s no question that his
diatribe expresses disapproval of the positions of these believers. The key sentence
expressing this disapproval is: “You got to stay pregnant, barefoot, and in the kitchen
and have babies until your body collapses.” On the other hand, it may well be true
that, taken as a whole, the main message of the teacher’s comments is that women
should have control over their reproductive choices. So the question is whether one
or two negative remarks about religion can be unconstitutional if embedded within a
larger message that is unquestionably valid. The court says no, citing an earlier Ninth
Circuit case for the proposition that if negative statements are “incidental” and
“ancillary” to a larger message, then they are insulated from constitutional attack. I
disagree. It’s one thing if the overall context of the statement makes it clear that the
isolated comments about religion are really not disapproving (for example, if the
context made it clear that the statements were made in jest or sarcastically), but
there’s no reason why the government should be able to make statements
disapproving of religion so long as it makes them in the context of a bigger
discussion that is not about religion. If the anti-Catholic resolution in San Francisco,
for example, had ten “Whereas” clauses, and only one of them disapproved of
Catholicism, why should that one clause be immunized? The real issue is why that
one clause had to be there in the first place. It adds nothing legitimate to the rest of
the message, and it imposes a significant harm upon religious believers. Likewise
with the comments about reproduction. The teacher was free to communicate his

115 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see generally Wexler, supra n. 92. See also Kent
Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J. Law & Politics 329 (2002).
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beliefs that women should be given control over reproductive choices, but he went
over the line by throwing in unnecessary derogatory comments about religion.116
III.

Conclusion: Disapproval’s Future

Claims that government has disapproved of religion are not exactly
threatening to clog the court system, but as I have tried to show in this Article, such
claims are completely consistent with the structure of the Religion Clauses and have
in fact made it to the federal courts on several occasions. The claims seem to be
coming more frequently, and with both religious diversity and nonbelief on the rise
in the United States, there is reason to think that disapproval controversies will
increase over time rather than decrease. The anti-disapproval side of what I’ve
termed the E/D test, then, will continue to play an important role in limiting the
government’s ability to openly denigrate the strongly held religious beliefs of the
nation’s citizens. Deciding what counts as disapproval and what does not count as
disapproval will not be an easy task. I have proposed a test here, called the “explicit
negative reference test,” that seeks to provide a workable and reasonable line to
distinguish constitutional government statements, messages, displays, and symbols
from unconstitutional ones, but the test is by no means automatic or simple to apply.
Others may, of course, propose competing tests that either reach further or are more
limited than my own. No matter what, however, one would expect that any test
seeking to enforce the anti-disapproval norm of the Establishment Clause would
make some non-negligible set of government utterances hostile to religion off limits
in order to protect the rights of religious believers.
Before bringing this argument to a close, however, it is worth recalling that
the anti-disapproval rule, whatever its specific content may turn out to be, is only
one side of the larger E/D test. Disapproval, for better or worse, is joined at the hip
with endorsement. If the endorsement side of the E/D test goes, so too goes the
disapproval side. The E/D test (or “the endorsement test,” as it’s always been
known) has always had its naysayers, both in the courts and in the academy, and with
the recent departure of the test’s creator, Justice O’Connor, and her replacement
with conservative justices Roberts and Alito, some have speculated that the test may
end up leaving the court with her.117 This would be a terrible shame. Not only does
One might counter here that this interpretation of the disapproval prong of the E/D test is
inconsistent with the way that courts have applied the endorsement side of that test, since courts have
held that the government can de-religion-ify a religious display (like a creche) by surrounding it with
non-religious figures (like a clown or elephant). See Lynch, 466 U.S., at 475. I’m not sure if these cases
are truly inconsistent with what I’m saying here (it’s not clear to me if a display is the same as a stated
message), but I would also note that I think the courts have not been nearly tough enough when
applying the endorsement side of the E/D test. Government endorsements of religion should not be
tolerated simply because the government surrounds those endorsements with secular messages.
117 See, e.g., Ian Bartum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 104 Northwestern
Univ. L. Rev. 1653, 1659-60 (2010) (“For the most part, Justice O’Connor’s approach has maintained
116
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the E/D test protect non-believers from having to endure official government
messages that mark them as second-class citizens, it also—as I’ve shown here—
protects believers from having to endure the same kinds of messages. Those antireligion messages have been rare up until now, but they may not remain rare forever.
Without the E/D test, courts will possess no doctrinal weapon to prevent the
government from lashing out against religious views. The Supreme Court would be
wise to keep the E/D test as it stands, and to use it to protect all the nation’s
citizens, regardless of what religion they believe in, and even if they believe in no
religion at all.

the support of a tenuous majority since 1992,45 but with her retirement in 2006, it was unclear
whether the test would long survive.”); Eugene Volokh, Is the Endorsement Test Up For Grabs in New
Supreme Court Case?, http://volokh.com/posts/1235406739.shtml (Feb. 23, 2009) (“My guess is that
there are now 5 votes on the Court rejecting the endorsement test: Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, who have criticized the test in the past, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, who I
suspect (based on the jurisprudential camp from which they come) would agree with the other
conservatives.”).
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